

David Cohen

Civic Culture and Government Performance in the American States

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Abstract

In a recent study, Robert D. Putnam reported a strong relationship between civic culture and government performance among the newly empowered regions of Italy. This study extends Putnam's methodology to the American states. Using similar techniques, we construct indices of civic culture and government performance for the states. When correlated, the results reveal a clear link between civicness and performance. States that are more civic tend to have effective governments that enact more liberal and innovative policies. This relationship between civicness and performance remains strong even after controlling for political culture, ideology, education, and a number of other factors.

The interplay between culture and politics has received a great deal of scholarly attention in the last few decades. Of particular interest has been the apparent causal link between civic culture and democracy. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba were among the first to investigate this relationship, concluding that successful democracy depends on a civic culture.¹ Since then, the role of civic culture in shaping democracy has been examined in dozens of countries.² Taken as a whole, the results of this research provide strong evidence that nations with a civic culture are more likely to become democratic and to stay democratic.

Recently, Robert D. Putnam examined civic culture and democracy in Italy.³ He contends that the degree to which Italy's newly empowered regional democratic governments have responded to the needs of their citizens is closely tied to the civic culture of the regions. Where people are generally civic, governments are more efficient and effective, meeting many citizen needs in a timely and professional manner, but where the prevailing culture is less civic, governments are noticeably less responsive, and politics takes on patron-client characteristics. Putnam goes on to claim that most regions have retained essentially the same civic culture for centuries and that civic culture enhances the economic development of the regions.

If correct, Putnam's findings are of substantial importance. Not only are the various civic cultures in Italy incredibly tenacious and instrumental in fostering development, they also greatly influence government performance. This last point warrants special emphasis. Most previous studies have explored whether democracies are more likely to emerge in a civic culture. For Putnam, democracy is a given; all of Italy's regional governments are

democratic. His concern is with the caliber of democratic government, and he finds that civic regions have more effective governments.

how do you measure caliber?

The purpose of our brief study is to initiate the process of applying Putnam's methods to the American states. Like the regions of Italy, all of the states are democracies; therefore, we will be investigating the extent to which the performance of these democratic governments differs across the civic cultures in the states. To begin, though, we need to devise an indicator of the civic culture of the states.

ELEMENTS OF A CIVIC CULTURE

Scholars have long argued about what makes a culture civic. Although this debate is far from settled, there does appear to be widespread agreement on a set of core characteristics. Putnam organizes these into four categories: civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and social structures of cooperation.

Civic Engagement. In a civic culture, citizens participate in public affairs and promote the public good. To be sure, self-interest can motivate much of their behavior, but citizens are conscious of the needs of their broader community, and they often act to meet these needs. For many civic citizens, self-interest and civic virtue are deeply intertwined and difficult to separate.

Political Equality. Citizens in a civic culture view each other as political equals, with the same rights and obligations. The relations between individuals in the public realm--and most private realms--are horizontal and cooperative, not vertical and authoritative.

Solidarity, Trust, and Tolerance. Citizens feel a strong sense of fellowship in a civic culture. This manifests itself in a readiness to trust and help others, and to tolerate a wide range of ideas and lifestyles.

Social Structures of Cooperation. A civic culture is home to a dense, interlocking web of social organizations. Citizens are joiners, belonging to a rich array of groups, from professional societies to neighborhood-watch associations, and from recreation volleyball teams to church social clubs. Through these affiliations, people experience first-hand the benefits of being civic.

With this list of civic characteristics in mind, our task turns to devising measures of these properties for the American states. To guide us, we rely heavily on the types of aggregate-level indicators that Putnam used to specify the civic cultures of Italy's regions. Ideally, we would supplement these measures with survey data on individuals' civic attitudes, but such data are scarce. The principal nationwide social science studies, such as the National Election Studies and the General Social Surveys, report their results by Census Bureau regions, not by states. Moreover, they employ cluster sampling, which means that the opinions of smaller states often come from only one or two locations. State data are available in the 1968 Comparative State Elections Project, but that study sampled opinions in only thirteen states. Finally, it might be possible to piece together some state survey data from various polls conducted by private firms, but it is highly unlikely that comparable questions have been asked across all the states. Unfortunately, then, we must rely on aggregate indicators to assess the civicness of the states.

THE CIVIC CULTURES OF THE AMERICAN STATES

We employ three measures to gauge the first component of civic culture, civic engagement.

Following Putnam's lead, we use newspaper circulation in the states as one indicator of citizen concern for public matters.⁴ People who read newspapers should be more interested in their communities and should be better equipped to participate constructively in

community affairs. As a second measure of engagement, we use the number of books per capita in the public libraries in each state.⁵ It seems to us that libraries, in their function as

education and civic centers, are exactly the type of institutions that should be supported by citizens serious about civic engagement. Our third measure is the number of community

improvement and philanthropic groups per capita in each state.⁶ We reason that citizens involved in groups like these are probably committed to promoting the public good.⁷

Four measures are used to assess the extent to which individuals in the states conceive of each other as equals. The first two have to do with gender in the work place. For each

state, we secured the percentage of public school teachers who are men and the percentage of state legislators who are women.⁸ Societies that are committed to equality should be more

willing to accept men in occupations traditionally held by women, such as public school teachers, and should be more willing to accept women in occupations traditionally held by

men, such as state legislators. The next measure of political equality is the number of civil rights groups per capita among the non-white population.⁹ Citizens devoted to equality

should be more likely to encourage the formation of groups committed to civil rights, and

they should be more likely to participate in these groups. A gauge of income distribution is

*Utah is low if you bias towards sparsely
count the L.O.S church
as one group
but high if you count
each
ward*

*In a civic culture, these
organizations are not needed. In a
society that takes from one group and
gives to another, they are needed.*

Populist states

Taking money from one group and giving it to another certainly creates interaction with the government. Is it good? Does it promote economic growth?

our last measure of equality.¹⁰

It seems to us that citizens in a society dedicated to equal

rights would endeavor to reduce disparities in personal incomes.

The third component of a civic culture--solidarity, trust, and tolerance--is assessed with three indicators. The first is the crime rate in each state;¹¹ clearly, there should be less crime in societies where citizens respect one another. The second measure is the number of lawyers per capita.¹² We reasoned that the need for lawyers should be less in a society where people feel a kinship with one another and trust one another, and where they are tolerant of the differences between individuals. Last, we use the default-rate on Perkins student loans as a gauge of the respect and trust among citizens.¹³

Our measure of the social structures of cooperation is a per capita composite index of twenty-six different types of non-profit organizations.¹⁴ Putnam contends that any association of individuals, whether it is a bird-watching club or a church congregation, can "contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government."¹⁵ Given this, we decided to include a wide variety of organizations in our measure.

These measures of the four components of civic culture are less than ideal. Like Putnam, we are forced by the available data to rely on indicators that are the product of many forces, not just civic culture. For example, newspaper readership may be as much a function of education as it is civic engagement. In order to mitigate the influence of these other factors, we combine our indicators into a single index, thereby maximizing the likelihood of measuring civicness. As added protection, we control for other potential influences, such as education, in the forthcoming regression analyses. Finally, it is

biased towards cold, less densely populated areas.

How about lobbying groups attempting to get other people's money?

Certainly

I can tell you
the results without
reading them.

important to stress that many of the other influences, like education, may be in part a product of civicness; it is not hard to imagine that a civic society will place more value on education.

To create an inclusive civic culture index for the states from our myriad of indicators, we first transformed the values for all of the indicators into z-scores. Next, we ordered the z-scores for each of the indicators so that the low scores (negative values) signified the less civic states and the high scores (positive values) signified the more civic states. If the civicness of the American states can be measured along a single dimension and if our indicators are reliable proxy measures for civicness, then the indicators should be positively correlated with each other. The data in Table 1 show that all but one of the correlations are positive (the negative correlation is between female legislators and the crime rate), indicating that we have a trustworthy set of measures. The next step in developing our index consisted of calculating the mean z-scores for each component, using only those indicators intended to measure that component. For example, the mean scores for civic engagement were figured by averaging the z-scores for the three indicators of engagement: newspaper circulation, books per capita in public libraries, and community improvement and philanthropic groups per capita. Within each component we decided to weigh each of the indicators equally because we could see no compelling theoretical or methodological reason for giving some indicators more influence than others. The correlations between the composite z-scores for the four components are quite high, ranging from .60 to .76. For the final step in creating our comprehensive index of the civicness of the states, we simply calculated the mean of the composite z-scores for the four components. The components were weighted equally because they are all, according to Putnam, integral parts of a civic

culture. The comprehensive index is presented in column 1 of Table 2, with the states arranged from most civic to least civic. According to the index, Vermont is the most civic state, followed by Massachusetts. At the other end of the scale, Mississippi and Louisiana are the least civic states.

(Tables 1 and 2 about here)

THE CORRELATES OF CIVIC CULTURE

Even a quick scan of the civic culture index reveals that many of the most civic states are in a northern tier running from New England to the Northwest, and that most of the least civic states are in the South. This pattern raises questions about the degree to which the index is a product of other factors, such as education or wealth. To test for these and other possibilities, we correlated the index with six common demographic variables: education, income, population, age, region, and the urban nature of the states.¹⁶ The results indicate that our civicness index is not closely linked to any of the demographic measures. The relationship with population is the strongest, but even here the correlation is only a modest .33. Moreover, when all of the factors are entered as independent variables in a multiple regression model where the civic index is the dependent variable, the R-square value is only .22, indicating that 78 percent of the variance in the index is left unaccounted for by the six variables. What this suggests is that the civicness of a state, as measured by our index, is not closely associated with the demographics of a state.

How does our index correlate with some political and social indices of the American states? Among the most widely used indicators of the political character of the states is

Daniel J. Elazar's trichotomy of subcultures: moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic.¹⁷

ad hoc
The moralistic subculture emphasizes good government, which "is measured by the degree to which it promotes the public good and in terms of the honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare of those who govern."¹⁸ By this description, the moralistic subculture would appear to have much in common with civic culture. In the individualistic subculture, government is concerned not so much with fostering a good society in the moral sense as with promoting and protecting private access to the marketplace. Government action is usually limited in scope and restricted to the economic realm. The traditionalistic subculture "is rooted in an ambivalent attitude toward the marketplace coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth."¹⁹ This subculture would appear to be the least civic of the three.

ad hoc
As a test of the relationship between Elazar's topology and our index of civic culture, we calculated the mean index score for the states in each of Elazar's categories.²⁰ The mean for the seventeen states that are considered moralistic is .4708, the mean for the fifteen states that are individualistic is .3049, and the mean for the sixteen states that are traditionalistic is -.8033.²¹ This rough comparison provides solid evidence that our index of civic culture is linked to Elazar's subcultures. The moralistic and individualistic states are more civic than average, while the traditionalistic states are substantially less civic. It is interesting to note that the individualistic states are almost as civic as the moralistic states, suggesting that an individualist political subculture is compatible with a civic culture.

Another index of the American states that is commonly used by social scientists is John L. Sullivan's continuum of diversity.²² This index arrays the states by the diversity of

their populations in terms of education, income, occupation, housing, ethnicity, and religion. According to the index, New York is the most diverse state, with a score of .556, and Mississippi is the least diverse, with a score of .230. When the diversity continuum is correlated with our civic culture index, the correlation coefficient is .56. The healthy positive relationship means that the more diverse states tend to be the most civic, thus raising the possibility that diversity and civic culture are causally linked. Perhaps the exposure to the wide range of lifestyles found in some states helps foster civic attitudes. If this is the case, and if civic attitudes promote effective government, then the possibility exists that in some situations, diversity may be an important causal antecedent to government performance. It is also possible, of course, that the most civic states are more diverse because they encourage a multiplicity of attitudes and lifestyles. And, the association between the diversity and civicness of the states may be spurious, the product of a third factor, such as economic development. Still, the correlation deserves further study, especially in light of Putnam's findings that it is civicness that influences economic development, not the reverse.

The third classification of the states that we compared to the civic culture continuum is the 1994 "livability" index, a popular ranking of the quality of life in the states.²³ First developed in 1991, this comprehensive index is calculated annually, using a myriad of factors, ranging from pupil-teacher ratios to highway fatalities involving alcohol. The correlation coefficient between this index and our civic culture continuum is an impressive .73. Apparently, the quality of life in a state is closely tied to its civic culture. It is also noteworthy that a few of the specific indicators used to build the livability index bear resemblance to the measures used by Putnam to construct his index of effective democracy.

Maybe they include the same variables.

Although it would be unwarranted to make too much of the similarities between Putnam's measures and the items in the livability index, the occasional parallels raise the possibility that the performance of democratic government in the American states is in part the product of civic culture. We now turn to investigating this potential link more directly.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND CIVIC CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Putnam uses dozens of specific indicators to construct his index of government performance. Almost every one of the indicators can easily be placed into one of the following three categories: policy liberalism, policy innovation, and administrative effectiveness. Policy liberalism refers to the extent to which societies have adopted the types of policies generally associated with modern liberalism, such as extensive welfare systems, progressive tax structures, and consumer protection standards. Putnam inserts a number of liberal measures in his index, including the number of publicly supported day-care centers and family-health clinics in each Italian region.²⁴ Policy innovation concerns the creative ability of societies to fashion policies to meet pressing needs. Among the innovation indicators used by Putnam is a legislative innovation score based on how quickly the regions adopted twelve different types of creative legislation, ranging from pollution-control statutes to hotel classification standards. Administrative effectiveness is defined as the extent to which governments respond to citizen needs. The administrative effectiveness measures employed by Putnam include a ranking of how quickly and competently the regional governments acted to meet specific citizen requests.

A civic state is
a liberal state. No bias
here.

Following Putnam's lead, we constructed a government performance index for the American states based on indicators of policy liberalism, policy innovation, and administrative effectiveness. For policy liberalism, we relied on a ranking of the states that combines eight policy measures "that reflect the usual ideological divisions between liberals and conservatives."²⁵ Our measure of innovation is from a comprehensive index of state policy creativity based on more than sixty types of policies.²⁶ The administrative effectiveness scores were figured by averaging two indices, the Barrileaux, Feiock, and Crew index of the quality of state administrations,²⁷ and the Bowman and Kearney index of the capacity of state government legislatures and governors to make effective and efficient decisions.²⁸ To produce a comprehensive index of government performance, we first made certain that the three indices--policy liberalism, policy innovation, and administrative effectiveness--were in standardized form; then we simply calculated the mean score for each state across the indices.²⁹ The results are shown in column 2 of Table 1, with positive scores associated with states that scored better on the performance index and negative scores with states that scored worse.

The relationship between the civic culture and the government performance indices is displayed in Figure 1. The states form an obvious upward sloping pattern, meaning that the more civic a state is, the more likely it is to have a liberal, innovative, and effective government. To be sure, there are plenty of exceptions. Some of the states that are highly civic have government performance scores that are well below average, and a few of the states that have only average civic values rank quite high on the performance index. Still, the link between culture and performance is indisputable. In formal statistical terms, the

correlation coefficient between culture and performance is .59, and the slope of the best-fitting line is .60, indicating that a one standard-deviation change in the culture index is associated with a six-tenths of a standard-deviation increase in government performance.

(Figure 1 here)

Although the strength of the relationship between civic culture and government performance in the states is pronounced, it is not as robust as the correlation of .92 that Putnam reports between culture and performance in the Italian regions.³⁰ One reason why the American relationship is weaker may be that the range of civic cultures in Italy is much greater than in the United States. Although both Italy and the United States have very civic areas, descriptions of southern Italy suggest that even the least civic American states are far more civic than this region.³¹ With the variance in the American index more restricted than in the Italian case, it may be difficult to achieve correlations as strong as those reported by Putnam. Along the same lines, it is possible that Putnam's index of government performance also varies more than our measure, raising the likelihood that his correlations would be stronger.

As interesting as it is to contrast Putnam's findings with our own, the value of civic culture as a concept for understanding government performance in the American states will come not from comparisons with Italy, but from testing the culture index against other explanations of government performance. To initiate this inquiry, we entered our culture index into a multiple regression equation to account for government performance and included nine other independent variables, the six demographic variables we examined earlier (education, income, population, age, region, and the urban nature of the states), and

Sullivan's diversity index,³² an indicator of Elazar's traditionalistic political subculture,³³ and a measure of the political ideology of citizenry based on public opinion surveys.³⁴ The results are presented in model 1 of Table 3. Our civic culture variable reaches statistical significance, as do the measures for population, ideology, and traditionalism. The effects of omitting the insignificant variables and recalculating the equation are presented in model 2. The substantive differences between the models are minimal; all four variables that are significant in the first model remain significant in the second model, and the R-squares are virtually identical.

(Table 3 about here)

Looked at in total, the findings in model 2 imply that the performance of state government is a function of attitudes and the size of the population. The attitudinal variables are civicness, traditionalism, and ideology. Considered individually, it is easy to see why each of these three indicators would be associated with government performance. What is more interesting is that all of the indices reach statistical significance in the same model. This suggests strongly that they are not mirror images of each other. A closer look at these variables provides some insight into how they might differ. Consider, for instance, the civic culture and ideology measures for the states. The natural expectation would be for states with civic populations to be liberal politically, favoring government initiatives to help the needy and ensure certain standards of equality. Upon reflection, however, it seems possible for a civic state to be politically conservative. Like all civic people, individuals in these states would be genuinely concerned with promoting the public good, but they would often resist using government for this purpose. These individuals might prefer to build a better

on page 13. Finally.

society through personal charity and through the organization of volunteer civic groups. As another example, consider civic culture and traditionalism. Traditionalism, as defined by Elazar³⁵ and Morgan and Watson,³⁶ has much in common with the values of Christian fundamentalism. To some people, a traditionalism of this type looks suspiciously uncivic. Many fundamentalists, after all, are not particularly tolerant of diverse values and life styles. It is also true, however, that fundamentalists are often very compassionate toward those in need, organizing community-service groups and giving generously of their time and money. Thus, it is possible that some very traditionalistic states might rank relatively high on the civic index. These two examples serve to show why the concepts of civic culture, traditionalism, and ideology are related, but not identical.

What is of special interest is the significance of the civic culture index. Even pitted against a variety of theoretically relevant explanatory variables, the index remains a powerful predictor of government performance. The coefficient in model 2 indicates that even after controlling for population, traditionalism, and ideology, a one standard-deviation change in the civic index corresponds to a three-tenths of a standard-deviation change in the performance index. This is solid evidence that the strong link between civicness and government performance that Putnam found in the Italian regions is present in the American states, too. If there is such a link, it would be valuable to understand more fully how the components of civic culture influence the components of government performance. It is possible, for instance, that civic culture is tightly linked with some dimensions of government performance and not others. We can make some initial observations in this area with our data. The index of civic culture is correlated with the policy liberalism index at .59, the

policy innovation index at .45, and the administrative effectiveness index at .39. All of these relationships are substantial, although the link with policy liberalism is somewhat more powerful. This suggests that civiness may have more to do with encouraging liberal policies than with promoting policy innovation or administrative effectiveness. We can also inspect how the four components of civiness relate to the index of government performance. The results show that the performance index is correlated with the civic engagement index at .59, the political equality index at .57, the solidarity, trust, and tolerance index at .63, and the social structures index at .34. Again, all the relationships are substantial, but the correlation with the social structures index is obviously the weakest. Perhaps social structures of cooperation are less important than the other components of civic culture in influencing government performance.

*We want
their
money
is good
government.*

DISCUSSION

If civic culture and government performance are coupled in such diverse settings as the American states and the Italian regions, the chances are good that the link exists in many other local and regional milieus. Some obvious places to check would be the other major federal democracies, such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland. In the United States, municipalities offer another locale for study. The variance in the civic cultures and government performance may be greater across cities than states, providing a fruitful laboratory for investigating the connection between culture and performance. John Kincaid³⁷ and Joel Lieske³⁸ have already established that there is a link between political

culture and the quality of life in United States metropolitan areas, so it seems reasonable that the civic culture of urban areas might influence government performance.

Other tasks also await scholarly attention. There is the vexing problem of trying to untangle the causal relationship between civic culture and government performance. Putnam was blessed with an unusual quasi-experimental situation; Italy's regional governments were empowered in the 1970s and endowed with similar resources by the central government. Thus, he could be relatively certain that the quality of the new governments was in part the product of civicness, not the other way around. Researchers looking at other subnational arenas will not be so fortunate. In the United States, for example, the states came into existence at different times and without much in the way of national government resources. Another causal conundrum is between civicness and economic development. Putnam was able to piece together enough indicators of civicness and development for nineteenth-century Italy to conclude that civicness fostered development and that development had little impact on government performance after controlling for civicness. With some effort, it should be possible to replicate his analysis in the United States. Certainly there are adequate indicators of economic development in the states that date back to at least the mid-1800s. Government performance will be more difficult to measure, but some indicators already exist, such as Robert Savage's state-by-state assessment of policy innovation in the nineteenth-century.³⁹

Clearly, there is more work to be done in exploring the link between civic culture and government performance in the American states. Our research addresses the most obvious first question: Is there a link between civic culture and government performance in the states? Our findings provide evidence that such a link exists; by our assessment, civic states

do tend to have better governments in terms of the measures of policy liberalism, policy innovation, and effectiveness used here.

TABLE 1
State Scores on Standardized Indices of Civic Culture and
Government Performance

high ranked

	<u>Civic Culture</u> Index ^a	<u>Government Performance</u> Index ^b
Vermont	1.52	0.44
Massachusetts	1.05	1.13
Wyoming	0.79	-0.46
Maine	0.78	0.36
North Dakota	0.76	-0.40
New Hampshire	0.75	-0.04
Nebraska	0.73	-0.06
Montana	0.73	0.11
Connecticut	0.64	0.79
Minnesota	0.64	0.76
Iowa	0.63	-0.02
New York	0.60	1.59
Colorado	0.59	0.44
South Dakota	0.50	-0.70
Washington	0.48	0.72
Rhode Island	0.44	0.41
Wisconsin	0.41	0.31
Oregon	0.40	0.81
Kansas	0.39	-0.27
Delaware	0.34	-0.14
Illinois	0.31	0.63
Ohio	0.28	0.80
Idaho	0.28	0.04
Alaska	0.26	-- ^c
Indiana	0.25	-0.17
Pennsylvania	0.16	0.67
Missouri	0.10	-0.39
Hawaii	-0.12	-- ^c
Virginia	-0.13	-0.65
California	-0.14	1.41
Oklahoma	-0.19	-0.21
New Jersey	-0.29	0.71
Michigan	-0.29	0.87
Maryland	-0.35	0.57
Utah	-0.40	0.32
Nevada	-0.47	-0.76
West Virginia	-0.50	-0.44
Arizona	-0.51	-0.91
Kentucky	-0.63	-0.43
Arkansas	-0.67	-0.69
North Carolina	-0.75	-0.93
Florida	-0.78	-0.04
Texas	-0.78	-0.52
New Mexico	-0.78	-0.22
Tennessee	-0.87	-0.30
Georgia	-0.93	-1.00
Alabama	-1.09	-1.20
South Carolina	-1.15	-1.45
Louisiana	-1.35	-0.56
Mississippi	-1.53	-1.45

*Civic culture bad
 government -
 Civic culture good
 government*

^aThe larger the civic culture score, the more civic the state.

^bThe larger the government performance score, the better the state government performs in terms of policy liberalism, policy innovation, and administrative effectiveness.

^cAlaska and Hawaii are omitted because of missing data.

TABLE 2
Correlation Matrix of the Civic Culture Indicators

Specific Indicators	<u>Components of a Civic Culture</u>										
	Engagement			Equality				Solidarity, Trust and Tolerance		Cooperation	
	<u>News^a</u>	<u>Library^b</u>	<u>Comm^c</u>	<u>Malteach^d</u>	<u>Feleg^e</u>	<u>Civil^f</u>	<u>Income^g</u>	<u>Crime^h</u>	<u>Lawyerⁱ</u>	<u>Loans^j</u>	<u>Groups^k</u>
News ^a	1.00										
Library ^b	.36	1.00									
Comm ^c	.49	.71	1.00								
Malteach ^d	.37	.56	.51	1.00							
Feleg ^e	.13	.44	.33	.52	1.00						
Civil ^f	.36	.50	.47	.73	.39	1.00					
Income ^g	.29	.33	.45	.41	.44	.62	1.00				
Crime ^h	.20	.46	.29	.27	-.06	.40	.17	1.00			
Lawyer ⁱ	.39	.36	.52	.47	.38	.27	.07	.31	1.00		
Loans ^j	.29	.40	.44	.56	.42	.68	.68	.24	.20	1.00	
Groups ^k	.33	.61	.54	.63	.47	.56	.35	.38	.35	.39	1.00

^aNewspaper circulation per capita

^bLibrary books per capita in public libraries

^cCommunity improvement and philanthropy/voluntarism groups per capita

^dPercent of public school teachers who are men

^ePercent of state legislators who are women

^fCivil rights groups per capita of non-whites

^gIncome inequality

^hCrime rate

ⁱLawyers per capita

^jDefault rate on Perkins student loans

^k501(c)(3) organizations per capita

TABLE 3
Determinants of Government Performance

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Civic Culture	0.37 (2.75) ^a	0.36 (3.08)
Education ^a	0.00 (0.03)	--
Income	-0.00 (-1.15)	--
Population	0.73 (4.39)	0.78 (5.71)
Age	-0.03 (-0.84)	--
Region	0.11 (0.54)	--
Urban/Rural	0.01 (1.06)	--
Diversity ^b	0.70 (0.34)	--
Traditionalism ^c	-1.10 (-1.88)	-1.33 (-3.62)
Ideology ^d	0.02 (2.16)	0.02 (2.18)
R-Square	.79	.78
N	48 ^e	48

^aSee footnote 10 for a description of the six demographic variables.

^bSullivan's index of diversity for the states.

^cMorgan and Watson's index of traditionalism for the states.


^dErikson, Wright, and McIver's index of ideology for the states.

^eThe values in parentheses are t-scores.

^fAlaska and Hawaii are omitted because of missing data.

Figure 1.

Civic Culture and Government Performance



Footnotes

AUTHORS' NOTE: We would like to acknowledge the assistance of Amber Sunshine in helping with the early stages of this research. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1995 meeting of the New England Political Science Association.

¹Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

²Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980); Larry Diamond, ed. Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science Review 82 (December 1988): 1203-1230; Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio Lopez Pina, "The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain," American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986): 735-760.

³Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁴Measured as the state newspaper circulation per capita, from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 568.

⁵Measured as the number of books per capita in public libraries, from the Digest of Education Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 432.

⁶Measured as the number of community improvement and philanthropy/voluntarism groups per capita, from Virginia Ann Hodgskinson, Murray S. Weitzman, Christopher M. Toppe, and Stephen M. Naga, eds., Nonprofit Almanac 1992-1993, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992).

⁷Voter turnout is another potential indicator of civic engagement; however, turnout rates in the states are heavily influenced by many factors that have little or nothing to do with civicness. For instance, the long-term party competition and the perceived closeness of a particular race affect turnout, as do elections laws, which vary significantly between states. To us, it seemed that voting is probably a good indicator of civicness at the level of the individual, but when aggregated to the state-level, it is strongly influenced by other, non-civic, factors. It is also worth noting that even at the level of individuals, voting is not always an indication of civicness. Many people vote primarily to promote their narrow self-interests, or because they feel pressured to by family or friends.

⁸Measured as the percent of public school teachers who are men and the percent of state legislators who are women, from Victoria Van Son, ed., State Fact Finder (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993).

⁹Measured as the number of civil rights groups per capita of non-whites: civic rights groups from Nonprofit Almanac 1992-1993 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993); non-white population from Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 30.

¹⁰Income inequality was calculated as follows. One measure was created by calculating the percentage of households in each state with incomes above the poverty level and below \$75,000. This gives the percentage of households with "mid-level" incomes. A

second measure was created by taking the absolute value of the percent of households below the poverty level from the percent earning above \$75,000. This gives the inequality between the ends of the income scale. For the final calculation of the variable, these two measures were transformed into z-scores, summed, and averaged. The income data come from the Digest of Education Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 28.

¹¹Measured as crime rate per 100,000 population, from Kathleen O'Leary Morgan, Scott Morgan, and Neal Quinto, eds., State Rankings 1994: A Statistical View of the 50 United States (Lawrence, KS: Morgan Quinto Corporation, 1994), p. 30.

¹²Measured as the number of lawyers per capita, from Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 204.

¹³Measured as the Perkins student-loan default-rate, from Van Son, ed., State Fact Finder, p. 133.

¹⁴Measured as the total number of 501(c)(3) organizations per capita, from Nonprofit Almanac 1992-1993. The categories of groups included are: arts, culture, humanities; education; environment; animal related; general health; mental health; disease, disorder related disease; medical research; legal related crime; job related employment; food, agriculture; housing, shelter; public safety; recreation, sports; youth development; human services; international affairs, foreign affairs; civic rights; community improvement; philanthropy, voluntarism; science; social science; public affairs; religious, related; mutual/membership benefit; unknown, unclassified. The state population figures are from

Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 30.

¹⁵Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 89.

¹⁶Education is measured as the percent of state population with a high school degree or more from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 155; income is measured as the mean household income for each state from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 461; population is measured as the 1990 state populations logged to base 10; age is measured as the percent of a state's population that is at least 65 years old from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 33; region is measured as 0 for non-southern states and 1 for the states of the old Confederacy (and Kentucky); and the urban nature of a state is measured as the percent of a state's population living in an urban setting from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 34.

¹⁷Daniel J. Elazar, The American Mosaic (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

¹⁸Ibid, p. 232.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 235.

²⁰We used the political culture scores from Charles A. Johnson, "Political Culture in the American States: Elazar's Formulation Examined," American Journal of Political Science 20 (August 1976): 491-509.

²¹Elazar does not categorize Alaska and Hawaii.

²²John L. Sullivan, "Political Correlates of Social, Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American States," Journal of Politics 35 (February 1973): 70-94.

²³Morgan, Morgan, and Quinto, eds, State Rankings 1994.

²⁴It is not altogether clear to us why civic societies would necessarily enact liberal policies. As we note elsewhere in the article, civic citizens could harbor reservations about government involvement in society, much like "classic" liberals and modern conservatives. These people might express their civicness through personal charity or through involvement in private associations, such as human service organizations and religious groups. Despite this possibility, we decided to stick with Putnam's decision and include policy liberalism as one component of good government. We should mention that our forthcoming analyses do show that policy liberalism is correlated with civicness in the American states. Still, it seems to us that there is ample reason for scholars to investigate the connection between civicness and modern liberalism in more detail.

²⁵Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 75.

²⁶Robert L. Savage, "Policy Innovation as a Trait of American States," Journal of Politics 40 (February 1978): 212-224.

²⁷Charles Barrileaux, Richard Feiock, and Robert E. Crew, Jr., "Measuring and Comparing American States' Administrative Characteristics," State and Local Government Review 24 (Winter 1992): 12-18.

²⁸Ann O'M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, "Dimensions of State Government Capability," Western Political Quarterly 41 (June 1988): 341-362.

²⁹The correlations between the three components of government performance range from .41 to .70.

³⁰Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 98.

³¹Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958); and Putnam, Making Democracy Work.

³²Sullivan, "Political Correlates of Social, Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American States."

³³David R. Morgan and Sheilah Watson, "Political Culture, Political System Characteristics, and Public Policies Among the American States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 21 (Spring 1991): 31-48. We also experimented with Ira Sharkansky's index of political culture from "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture," Polity 2 (Fall 1969): 66-83. Sharkansky's index and Morgan and Watson's traditionalism index are correlated at .83, suggesting that they are almost identical. In the end, we opted for the Morgan and Watson's traditionalism measure because our analyses earlier suggested that the civic culture of moralistic and individualistic states are almost the same, but that there is a major difference between the culture of traditionalistic states and all others.

³⁴Erikson, Wright, and McIver, Statehouse Democracy.

³⁵Elazar, The American Mosaic.

³⁶Morgan and Watson, "Political Culture, Political System Characteristics, and Public Policies Among the American States."

³⁷John Kincaid, "Political Culture and the Quality of Urban Life," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 10 (Spring 1980): 89-110.

³⁸Joel Lieske, "The Correlates of Life Quality in U.S. Metropolitan Areas," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 20 (Winter 1990): 43-54.

³⁹Savage, "Policy Innovation as a Trait of American States."